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Introduction 
 
This Symposium confronts the reality that genetic technologies – not just genetic tests, but 
tools for altering plant, animal, and human genomes – are rapidly becoming and indeed already 
are consumer technologies. People can experiment with and apply these technologies in 
disintermediated formats, potentially without the involvement of national research funding 
agencies, professional scientists, physicians, genetic counselors, regulators, and traditional 
medical product manufacturers. The framework of 20th-century medical product and practice 
regulations assigned each of these parties a role in promoting ethical, safe, and effective biomedical 
research and health care.1 Do-it-yourself biotechnology (DIYbio), which includes direct-to-
consumer (DTC) and do-it-yourself (DIY) genomic technologies, threatens to disrupt these roles. 
This raises concerns about how to protect consumer safety, the safety of research participants, and 
environmental and public safety to the extent these technologies are deployed in uncontained, 
open-release applications.2  
Some of these concerns relate to the mechanics of regulation – for example, how to stretch 
existing regulatory principles and authorities to cover novel products and delivery pathways. Yet 
these technologies also raise questions about the very goals of regulation, forcing us to reexamine 
first principles such as, “What is the regulatory enterprise trying to accomplish?” This Article 
touches on both these themes before concluding that some of the gaps in the current regulatory 
framework for DIYbio are appropriate and ought to be preserved. 
 
Focusing the Discussion 
 
Before turning to those questions, it is useful to clarify how the terms “citizen science,” 
“DIY genomics,” and “DIYbio” are used in this article. Discussions of how to regulate this 
movement often assume that people participating in it are scientifically unsophisticated and require 
close supervision as a result. An excellent article by Andrea Wiggins and John Wilbanks 
acknowledges that citizen science comprises diverse activities that employ a range of scientific 
methods and different modes of participant involvement.3 They define citizen science as “a range 
of participatory models for involving non-professionals as collaborators in scientific research.”4  
However, the available empirical evidence does not always support the narrative that citizen 
 
1 See generally NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., PREPARING FOR FUTURE PRODUCTS OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 67–102 (2017) (ebook) [hereinafter NASEM REPORT] (summarizing the current U.S. regulatory 
framework for biotechnology products). 
2 Id. at 27–58 (describing trends, including DIYbio, that threaten to disrupt traditional biotechnology oversight 
mechanisms).  
3 Andrea Wiggins & John Wilbanks, The Rise of Citizen Science in Health and Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS, n. 8, 2019, at 3. 
4 Id. (emphasis added).  
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scientists are non-professionals or scientifically naïve; many are scientists employed in academic, 
corporate, or governmental laboratories who pursue DIYbio as an avocation, but one they are well-
qualified to pursue.5  
Professor Lisa Ikemoto explores various narratives of DIYbio.6 There are expressly 
political narratives that sound in democratization of science, and nostalgic accounts that portray 
DIYbio as returning science to non-commercial aims and an open-sharing ethos that allegedly was 
lost after passage of the Bayh-Dole Amendments in the early 1980s.7 She draws on an 1893 paper 
by Frederick Jackson Turner8 to suggest an intriguing alternative: DIYbio serves as a frontier of 
institutional science, an outlet or safety valve that provides an “unconstrained space” to pursue 
inquires that, although valid and potentially important, are not being pursued at the nation’s 
traditional scientific institutions.9  The reasons might include, for example, ethical misgivings 
about the research or the lack of traditional sources of research funding, such as National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) grants.  
Tinkering with the human genome involves risks that are poorly understood and difficult 
to manage at this time. These include the risk of  unintended off-target effects that might damage 
regions of the genome that were not the focus of research, and a risk of unintentionally promoting 
cancer while attempting to introduce a beneficial change.10 Traditional research ethics, and the 
traditional research institutions that implement those ethics, might view these risks as ethically 
justified under certain circumstances and for certain narrow research aims such as trying to develop 
therapies for serious or deadly health conditions that lack good therapeutic options. The risks are 
harder to justify for many other research aims, such as cosmetic enhancement. Many of these other 
research aims do offer potential benefits; it would be highly beneficial to have a therapy that could 
keep us all looking 25 years old forever. Unfortunately, many beneficial lines of research are 
ethically problematic or fall outside the funding priorities of the traditional research enterprise. 
Professor Ikemoto’s “frontier” theory portrays citizen science and DIYbio as a needed space for 
scientists to pursue these beneficial aims.11  
Doing so may require citizen scientists to internalize research risks by experimenting on 
themselves. It might be argued that self-experimentation is, in fact, ethically superior to involving 
hapless research participants in projects that are potentially beneficial but ethically questionable.12 
At times, medical self-experimentation has spurred important advances in biomedicine. Allen 
Weisse surveyed 465 instances of medical self-experimentation after 1800.13 He found that twelve 
Nobel Prize winners between 1903 and 2005 engaged, at one time or another, in biomedical self-
 
5 Lisa C. Ikemoto, DIY Bio: Hacking Life in Biotech’s Backyard, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 539, 541, 546 (2017). 
6 Id. at 548–52. 
7 Id. at 550–51.  
8 The Significance of the Frontier in American History, NAT’L HUMAN. CTR. (May 2005), 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/gilded/empire/text1/turner.pdf. (quoting speech by Frederick Jackson Turner 
to American Historical Association in Chicago July 12, 1893). 
9 Ikemoto, supra note 5, at 552.  
10 See, e.g., Erika Check, Second Cancer Case Halts Gene-Therapy Trials, 421 NATURE 305, 305 (2003) (reporting 
that a gene-therapy trial to address severe combined immunodeficiency disease (SCID, or “bubble boy disease”) in 
children had been halted after some of the participants developed leukemia, raising concerns that the research had 
inadvertently damaged a tumor-suppressor gene). 
11 Ikemoto, supra note 5, at 552. 
12 Barbara J. Evans, Parsing the Line Between Professional and Citizen Science, 19 AM. J. BIOETHICS 15, 15 (2019).  
13 Allen B. Weisse, Self-Experimentation and its Role in Medical Research, 39 TEX. HEART INST. J. 51, 51–54 
(2012). 
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experimentation and, in seven cases, the Nobel Prize was for the work that relied on self-
experimentation.14  
While “legitimate” scientists generally favor other methodologies today, self-
experimentation was common in the United States until the mid-20th century.15 Small research 
cohorts, including cohorts of one person, could shed light on important research questions of that 
era, when infectious diseases, vaccines, and anesthesia were topics of great scientific concern.16 In 
the research ethics of that day, some scientists considered it unethical to expose other people to 
research risks, as opposed to taking the risks oneself.17  
In the last half of the 20th century, the nation’s disease burden shifted and new research 
methodologies, such as randomized, controlled clinical trials, emerged. These developments called 
for ever-larger cohorts of research participants to answer contemporary research questions. 
Research ethicists responded by enunciating modern standards, such as the Common Rule,18 that 
conceive research as something scientists do to other people. The ethics of self-experimentation 
ceased to command much attention. Yet in some respects, gene-editing research resembles the 
early vaccine research of the 19th century as much as it resembles a late 20th century large-scale 
clinical trial. Self-experimentation may, once again, be a useful research methodology in certain 
contexts. A fresh look at ethical and regulatory principles, and how to promote compliance with 
them, may be warranted.  
This article accepts Professor Ikemoto’s view of DIYbio as a frontier for scientific 
discovery but develops an additional point: DIYbio is also a frontier for business model innovation. 
Christenson, Grossman, and Hwang, in their excellent study of disruptive innovation in health 
care, remark that new technologies are, at most, enablers of transformative change that can make 
a real difference in people’s lives.19 Advances in genomics will be necessary, but not sufficient, to 
transform the quality of health care. There also must be business model innovation that profitably 
delivers new technologies in ways that are affordable and accessible to consumers, and new value 
networks, which are commercial infrastructure in which the various players “exert disruptive, 
mutually reinforcing economic models.”20  
Economic and regulatory factors create a significant risk that scientific advances in 
genomics may fail to improve the lives of patients and consumers who might benefit. Today’s 
legacy regulatory frameworks were designed for an industry structure and business models that 
 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 545 (citing SAUL BENISON, TOM RIVERS: REFLECTIONS ON A LIFE IN MEDICINE AND SCIENCE 54 M.I.T. Press 
1967)).  
18 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A (2018).    
19 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSON ET AL., THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH 
CARE (2017). 
20 Id.  
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prevailed in the latter half of the 20th century, the heyday of non-personalized blockbuster medical 
products, for which high regulatory costs could be spread across large numbers of consumers. 
These same regulatory processes, when applied to modern gene therapies for orphan or ultra-
orphan (extremely rare) conditions, deliver safe and effective therapies at eye-popping prices.21 
Glybera, a gene therapy to treat a rare blood disorder, came to market in the EU at a cost of 1.1 
million Euros for a course of treatment, only to be withdrawn after only one patient managed to 
surmount the steep barriers to insurance reimbursement.22 Gene therapies promise to restore sight 
to the blind but only if the blind, who experience above-average rates of poverty, unemployment, 
and noninsurance,23 can self-pay as much as a million dollars per eye to see again. No matter how 
great the science is, this is not a workable business model. Shaking up yesterday’s business models 
may ultimately be the most useful contribution DIYbio and citizen science make.  
This article explores the challenge of regulating of DIYbio and citizen science generally, 
but then zooms in on genomic self-experimentation as a potential focus of regulatory concern. To 
keep matters in perspective, DIYbio today mostly involves fairly basic activities such as testing 
oneself to detect the presence or absence of specific genetic variants; extracting DNA; purifying 
proteins; or genetically engineering bacteria, yeast, cells, or plants.24 Despite isolated reports of 
people injecting themselves with gene-editing chemicals,25 there is currently no rush of people 
trying to edit their own genomes.26 While not a focus of DIYbio activities today, such attempts are 
foreseeable and do warrant some discussion, mainly to probe what the goals of regulation ought 
to be.  
 
 
21 Gregory Daniel et al., Advancing Gene Therapies and Curative Health Care Through Value-Based Payment 
Reform, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171027.83602/full/. 
22 GRACE MARSDEN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV., GENE THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE, 
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE, AND PAYING FOR VALUE 19–20, 26 (2017).  
23 See Blindness Statistics, NAT’L FED’N BLIND, https://www.nfb.org/resources/blindness-statistics (last visited Apr. 
3, 2020) (citing statistics on the economic impact of blindness); see also Diana M. Zuckerman, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
POL’Y RES. FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BLIND ADULTS IN AMERICA: THEIR LIVES AND CHALLENGES (2004) (reporting 
U.S. statistics). 
24 DANIEL GRUSHKIN ET AL., SEVEN MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT DO-IT-YOURSELF BIOLOGY 11 (Woodrow 
Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars 2013). 
25 Molly Campbell, Meet Josiah Zayner, The Biohacker Next Door, TECH. NETWORKS (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.technologynetworks.com/genomics/articles/meet-josiah-zayner-the-biohacker-next-door-320964.  
26 See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 24, at 1. 
27 See NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 69–70 (discussing the role of NIH guidelines in governance of both public 
and privately funded genomic research). 
28 Id.   
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Twentieth-Century Regulation for the Twenty-First Century 
 
The United States entered the 21st century with legacy regulations designed in the 20th 
century. In those days, creation of nonmarket and public goods, such as upstream basic research 
to discover new therapies, received public support through entities like the NIH which, through 
the power of its immense purse strings, elicited compliance with important research, ethical, and 
biosafety norms.27 These same norms were embraced by many commercial research organizations 
that were not, legally speaking, obliged to follow them.28 In a competitive environment for research 
funding, both public and private funders implemented rigorous review processes that deterred the 
pursuit of “junk” science. 
Medical product manufacturers, shielded by patents and high regulatory barriers to entry, 
attained the scale and strong balance sheets that it takes to bear the costs of generating evidence to 
support premarket regulatory review of their products.29 The large scale (and relatively small 
number) of manufacturers made close regulatory scrutiny feasible and cost-effective.30 Healthcare 
providers were generally convincing in the role of learned intermediaries. They incorporated 
patient-specific data into decisions about how to treat real patients using products only shown safe 
and effective for the average clinical trial participant, and they dispensed off-label prescriptions to 
treat, or at least mollify, patients whose maladies had no approved remedies. All together, these 
players delivered fairly good health care to many patients, with trial lawyers waiting in the wings 
to pursue remedies if their efforts fell short of this goal. That was the orderly world of 20th-century 
regulation—a world that is now being disrupted.  
By 2015, the Obama Administration foresaw this problem and began efforts to update the 
United States’ framework for regulating biotechnology. These efforts included a study of new 
types of biotechnology products expected to become available over the next decade and the 
adequacy of existing regulations to ensure consumer and patient safety and address environmental 
and other hazards they might entail. The U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and 
Medicine (“NASEM” or  the “National Academies”) performed that study and published it in 
2017.31  The study presumed that, within the ten-year time horizon of the study, it would not be 
possible to implement major regulatory reforms because of the time required to draft new 
legislation, enact it, and put new regulations in place.32 This implied that the new products would 
have to be regulated using the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
 
 
 
 
 
29 INST. MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 197 (Alina 
Baciu et al. eds., Nat’l Academies Press 2007). 
30 See Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in Sharing Economy, 53 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 949, 964–66 (2016) (reviewing literature addressing the relationship between the scale of regulated 
enterprises and the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of regulatory efforts). 
31 NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 70–71. 
32 Id. at 68. 
33 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986). 
34 NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 70. 
35 Id. 
36 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23302. 
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(Coordinated Framework), which is the scheme of federal oversight conceived in response to 
advances in recombinant DNA technology back in the 1980s.33 Those advances raised concern 
that there would be a large number of new recombinant DNA products for which existing 
regulatory frameworks might prove inadequate.  
Congress toyed with the idea of enacting special biotechnology legislation, but ultimately 
did not do so.34 In 1984, a Working Group on Biotechnology working under the White House 
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment recommended that existing federal 
agencies – such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) – should regulate new 
biotechnology products using the statutory authorities they already had.35 In 1986, this approach 
was formalized in the Coordinated Framework, which clarifies how the various agencies will share 
responsibilities.36   
The Coordinated Framework grants no new powers to the agencies. Each has only the 
powers Congress already granted to it in its enabling statutes. Thus, the FDA uses the authorities 
it has under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)37 and the Public Health Service 
Act (“PHSA”); the EPA regulates under its existing statutes, such as the Toxic Substances Control 
Act; and the USDA implements the Plant Protection Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, and 
other statutes.38 The Coordinated Framework was updated in 1992 and at the end of the Obama 
Administration in January 2017, although this latter update expressly declined to address 
biotechnologies, like human genome editing, that FDA regulates as medical products.39 The FDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C §§ 301–397 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)). 
38 See OFFICE OF SCI. TECH. POL’Y, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AN UPDATE TO THE COORDINATED 
FRAMEWORK FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 9 (2017) (providing a list of key statutes).  
39 Id.; Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753–62 (Feb. 27, 
1992).  
40 PETER HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1123 (W. Acad. Publ’g 4th ed. 2014). 
41 NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
42 Id. at 10. 
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already had efforts underway, as of 2017, to set policies for those products, so the revised 
Coordinated Framework deferred to the FDA.   
The Coordinated Framework is criticized as a loose collection of antiquated statutes, none 
of which was designed for the biotechnology products of today. To some degree, this is a fair 
criticism. Today, the FDA is tasked with regulating the latest human gene-editing products using 
drug authorities rooted in the 1938 FFDCA and the even older biologics authorities of the PHSA, 
which harken back to the age when diphtheria antitoxin and smallpox vaccine were the latest 
technologies.40 The National Academies, in their 2017 study, expressed concern that new products 
might fall through gaps in regulatory jurisdiction and that the regulatory powers these old statutes 
confer are not always what the agencies need to regulate effectively.41 For example, a power to 
require brief, premarket studies does not answer long-term safety questions about gene-editing 
products, which might require lifelong monitoring to assess whether they elevate patients’ cancer 
risks. Another concern was that the sheer pace, volume, and complexity of current innovations 
could threaten to overwhelm the agencies’ existing regulatory capacity.42  
Despite these concerns, the Coordinated Framework has worked fairly well over the past 
three decades. Congress used broad language when defining the products – for example, “drug,” 
“biological product,” “device,” “food,” “pesticide,” “plant pest,” and “chemical” – that the FDA, 
EPA, and USDA are authorized to regulate.43 The agencies have significant – although not 
unlimited44 – discretion to determine what fits in these definitions. The FDA, in particular, has a 
long history of construing novel products as fitting within its available jurisdictional categories, 
and courts frequently defer to the agency’s determinations. A classic example is a 1969 case in 
which the Supreme Court backed the FDA in deeming a product to be a drug, even though the 
product undoubtedly would be a device under today’s standards, because the FDA’s determination 
was “consistent with the FFDCA’s overriding purpose of protecting the public health.”45 There is 
little doubt that many of the products used in DIY genomics and citizen science are of the sort that 
the FDA and its sister agencies are authorized to regulate under the Coordinated Framework.  
 
 
Strains in the Coordinated Framework 
 
If the Coordinated Framework is currently under stress, this is not because of the 
technologies and products that modern biotechnology is producing. There are a few notable gaps 
in regulatory coverage, but the technologies and products are, for the most part, well within the 
scope of what the Coordinated Framework was designed to regulate. Instead, the major strain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 See id. at 209–12 (listing some of the statutory definitions). 
44 Nat’l Nutritional Foods v. Matthews, 557 F.2d 325, 336 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that proposed FDA 
regulations that treated vitamins A and D as drugs, instead of foods, were invalid as “arbitrary and capricious and 
not in accordance with law.”). 
45 United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 374 U.S. 784, 798 (1969). 
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relates to new business models for delivering biotechnology products and services. “The very 
concept of ‘regulation,’ as developed and practiced under the web of old statutes the Coordinated 
Framework rests on, fails unless there are suitable entities to regulate.”46 The Coordinated 
Framework and its underlying statutes presume a 20th-century biotechnology industry structure 
that has – and will continue to have – ongoing vitality. However, the traditional players 
increasingly will be competing alongside new players with new business models, some of which 
can evade regulation under current statutes.  
Twentieth-century biotechnology regulations direct the regulator’s attention to “product 
developers,” mainly conceived as “U.S. and international corporations, research organizations, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises” that are involved in commercial development, 
manufacturing, or distribution of biotechnology products.47 The regulator stands as an 
intermediary between these commercial entities and “the public and society,” whose safety the 
regulator is empowered to protect.48 Members of the public occasionally fall under these 
regulations, for example, if Grandma launches a website offering her traditional home remedy for 
commercial sale to the public as a cure for arthritis. In general, however, members of the public 
play a passive role, simply consuming the products that corporate product developers design and 
manufacture, usually with little public input or involvement. Individuals often engage in 
“[u]nregulated domestic production and use”—for example, preparing a home remedy for 
themselves instead of buying a manufactured drug—but regulators use their discretion and 
generally avoid regulating these activities so long as they are small in scale and have personal, 
non-commercial aims.49 
The National Academies’ 2017 study noted several trends that are disrupting this 
traditional regulatory landscape.50 An obvious example is DIYbio, carried out in community 
laboratories or in people’s homes. Another is non-traditional funding sources for research, 
including crowdsourced funding for biotech research and development projects. The result is that 
important research activities now are occurring beyond the reach of the ethical and safety norms 
traditionally tied to public research funding and corporate research policies that often embrace 
those same norms.51 There are new commercial manufacturers operating in decentralized formats 
or at a smaller scale than the larger product developers of the past. These smaller players 
sometimes lack the well-staffed regulatory compliance departments with which regulators have 
traditionally interfaced, and they may lack the large retained earnings that product developers 
traditionally used to fund studies to develop the evidence on which regulators rely when approving 
new products.52 “A key, new element associated with the development of biotechnology products 
in the United States is the multiplicity of different players that intersect and collaborate in flexible 
but robust entrepreneurial ecosystems.”53  
These changes are spawning new business models: First, there are new business-to-
business models. These include, for example, contractors that offer bioinformatics services to 
 
46 BARBARA J. EVANS, PROGRAMMING OUR GENOMES, PROGRAMMING OURSELVES: THE MORAL AND REGULATORY 
CHALLENGE OF REGULATING DO-IT-YOURSELF GENE EDITING, IN CONSUMING GENOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen et al. 
eds., forthcoming 2021). 
47 See NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 20 fig.1-1 (portraying this relationship). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 27. 
51 Id. at 85.  
52 Id. at 33–35. 
53 Id. at 36. 
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existing product developers and laboratories, or laboratories that make DNA fragments and other 
chemicals to order for other product developers.54 Second, there are new business-to-consumer 
models.55 A good example is DTC genetic testing services. Third, there are new consumer-to-
consumer models.56 These include individuals making products for commercial sale to other 
members of the public. However, they also include individuals providing services, such as creating 
a community laboratory that others can use to make their own products, or publishing instructions 
to guide others in their own DIYbio activities. The fourth model blurs the roles of producer and 
consumer, as when practitioners of DIYbio make products for their own enjoyment or 
consumption.57   
The end products of these new arrangements often are of a sort that the FDA and its sister 
agencies traditionally have regulated. However, these new business models may cause some or 
all of the production chain to evade regulatory oversight. For example, the FDA can regulate an 
entity that manufactures or distributes a product and does so with the intent it be used to 
diagnose, treat, or prevent a disease or health condition.58 A business-to-business laboratory that 
synthesizes DNA fragments or chemicals is manufacturing a product and seemingly would be 
subject to FDA regulation, because the FDA’s definition of a “drug” includes “a component” of 
a finished drug product.59  In contrast, a business-to-business provider of bioinformatics analysis 
is supplying a service, rather than a product, and seemingly escapes FDA’s jurisdiction. Even if 
the software helps a drug manufacturer screen the safety of its finished drug, the software is not 
itself a drug component. The FDA can regulate software as a medical device (SAMD), stand-
alone software that is intended to diagnose, treat, or prevent disease.60 However, the 
bioinformatics software in this example is not itself intended for use in treating patients; it is 
intended for use in designing a drug, and the drug is the product that will treat the patient. This 
software, therefore,  does not appear to qualify as SAMD. 
The new business-to-consumer models present similar issues. The FDA has already 
asserted jurisdiction over several DTC test providers, such as 23andMe, whose advertising or test 
reports suggested they intended for their tests to be used in diagnosing, treating, or preventing 
disease.61 Other DTC providers, however, offer data-only services that simply report which genetic 
variants the person has, without making any claims or interpretive statements about how those 
variants might affect the person’s health. FDA officials have indicated in the past that they do not 
view data-only tests as medical devices that the agency can regulate.62 Consumers can then enter 
their data-only results into various online software tools or submit them to stand-alone genetic 
interpretation services that help consumers understand how their variants might affect their health. 
It is not clear that the FDA can regulate those tools and services, because the providers are 
 
54 Id. at 37. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 37. 
57 Id. at 36. 
58 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h) (2018).. 
59 Id. § 321g(1)(4).  
60 See INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULATOR’S F., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): KEY DEFINITIONS 6 (2013) 
(defining software as a medical device). 
61 21 U.S.C. § 321(h). 
62 Dan Vorhaus et al., DTC Testing and the FDA: Is There an End in Sight to the Regulatory Uncertainty?, 
GENOMES UNZIPPED (June 16, 2011), http://genomesunzipped.org/2011/06/dtc-genetic-testing-and-the-fda-is-there-
an-end-in-sight-to-the-regulatory-uncertainty.php#more-3681.  
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distributing informational or professional services, without manufacturing or performing any 
tests.63  
Consumer-to-consumer business models present similar ambiguities. An individual who 
uses DIYbio to synthesize a product for others is a manufacturer, as far as the FDA is concerned, 
and that is true whether the product is sold or distributed gratis. If the individual intends for the 
product to be used as a dietary supplement, food additive, or medical food (e.g., a genetically 
enhanced yogurt culture) or as a cosmetic or drug (e.g., an anti-aging potion), the FDA can regulate 
it, assuming the agency finds out the product exists.64 The DIY practitioner could, however, evade 
FDA jurisdiction if it refrained from manufacturing the product and instead published instructions 
on how to make the product or established a community laboratory that customers can use, for a 
fee, to make their own supplies. These latter activities are in the nature of services, and writing 
“how-to” books often enjoys First Amendment protection. DIYbio products can be delivered in 
various ways that may, or may not, be subject to regulation. 
The fourth business model – producing biotechnology products for one’s own use – 
presents special regulatory issues discussed later in this article. DIYbio projects are extremely 
diverse. Many are unrelated to health and raise few, if any, regulatory concerns. Good examples 
are projects to develop genetic tests to identify which neighborhood dog is defiling one’s yard, or 
to detect whether restaurants are correctly advertising the species of fish in their sushi.65 In 
contrast, other DIYbio efforts – such as a diabetic’s attempt to make low-cost insulin, or a 
gardener’s attempt to engineer plants for open release into the environment – do raise important 
questions about the capacity of Coordinated Framework agencies to provide adequate oversight.66  
The new business models create challenges that the National Academies described in their 
2017 study:  Today’s biotechnology platforms – that is, products used to make other biotechnology 
products – have altered the relationship between “wet-lab” and “dry-lab” functions within the 
product supply chain.67 Wet-lab products are physical things like DNA/RNA, cells, enzymes, 
vectors, and sequencing prep kits, whereas dry-lab products are things like computer-aided design 
software or bioinformatics tools which, when offered on a stand-alone basis, are in the nature of 
services.68 The new platforms make it possible to redesign the workflows required to make new 
biotechnology products. The result is new business models, some of which may fall outside the 
jurisdiction of traditional safety and environmental regulators like the FDA, EPA, and USDA. The 
entity that manufactures a new product may be different from the entity that forms the intent for 
how it will be used. This can leave gaps in regulatory coverage, even when the finished product is 
of a sort that the public expects is receiving governmental oversight. Even when regulators do have 
jurisdiction, the presence of new and unconventional players creates novel challenges. For 
example, agencies trying to monitor DIYbio to address bioterrorism risks have embraced a light-
handed approach because of concerns that aggressive regulatory enforcement might drive these 
activities underground, making oversight even more difficult than it already is.69    
 
The Practical Challenge of Regulating Small, DIY Producers  
 
63 Gail H. Javitt & Katherine Strong Carner, Regulation of Next Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9, 
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67 NASEM REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.  
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Individuals, working at home or in community laboratories, now are able to manufacture 
products that once would have required a large organization to assemble. Individuals have access 
to sophisticated software tools to help them design strands of DNA to perform particular functions, 
such as enabling a cell to detect a specific chemical stimulus and react to it.70 Using these tools, 
individuals can design strands of DNA or guide RNAs for CRISPR editing systems that can make 
cells have new characteristics.71 Standard biological parts, such as off-the-shelf DNA strands to 
perform particular functions, are available for purchase, and contract laboratories can synthesize 
customized DNA and RNA in response to a customer’s order.72  Even individuals with “no special 
knowledge of genetic engineering” can manipulate plant and animal genomes.73 
The providers of goods and services with which the individual does business may or may 
not be subject to oversight by Coordinated Framework agencies like the FDA. A vendor whose 
software can design DNA molecules is not involved in manufacturing any physical product, and 
may not form any particular intent with respect to how the molecules will be used. The contract 
laboratory that manufactures DNA sequences and other molecules may be unaware of their 
ultimate intended use. Many of these products lend themselves to a wide variety of uses, so that it 
is not possible to infer an intent for clinical use from the mere fact that an order was placed and 
filled. The product might end up in a hobby project to modify an orchid plant, or in a preclinical 
research use, or in an attempt to modify a human genome for therapeutic purposes. The Federal 
Select Agent Program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Centers for 
Disease Control recognizes a small number (roughly 65) of biological agents that have narrow 
uses and a high potential for harm, such that any shipment of these chemicals triggers regulatory 
oversight.74 Outside this small set of biological agents, which include things like the Ebola virus, 
most of the things laboratories ship cannot be presumed to have any particular intended use. FDA 
seemingly has no basis to infer that the contract laboratory intended for its creation to be used as 
a medical product.  
This leaves the individual DIYbio practitioner as a potential target for regulation, but 
regulating these small players poses a number of logistical and practical challenges, even when an 
agency like the FDA theoretically has jurisdiction to do so. Similar challenges occur in regulating 
participants in the sharing economy, which includes people who drive for ride-hailing services like 
Uber and Lyft or who rent their homes through platforms like Airbnb.75 “[S]cale is a defining 
feature and fundamental challenge of the sharing economy.”76 The nation’s legacy regulatory 
frameworks are designed to regulate a discrete number of large, commercial product developers. 
The sharing economy includes three-way transactions among a massive number of small providers, 
consumers, and platforms that bring them together.   
The sharing economy is large in the aggregate, with it estimated that about half of 
Americans participate either as producers or consumers, but missing are the large providers of 
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goods and services that were the focus of 20th century regulatory schemes.77 Zale points out that 
20th century regulators could order hotels to implement consumer safety measures and to 
accommodate disabled guests; the hotels were at known locations that regulators could easily 
inspect, and the hotels had sufficient revenue to absorb the regulatory compliance costs. The same 
is not true as hotels are replaced by millions of individual homeowners renting a room through 
home-sharing services like Airbnb; “when everything is small, the regulatory challenge is 
immense.”78 In some cases, 20th century regulations expressly exclude small actors from 
regulation, as seen in some labor laws and workplace safety regulations.79 Even when regulations 
do not expressly provide breaks for small suppliers, regulators have often used their discretion to 
avoid regulating them.  
Zale explores traditional and emerging rationales for non-regulation of small players.80 One 
is the de minimis nature of individual, small-scale activities, which may have only a minor link to 
interstate commerce. It is thought harsh to place the heavy burdens and costs of regulatory 
compliance on small players, and there are concerns about the feasibility and costs of having 
regulatory agencies scale up to oversee activities at thousands or millions of diffuse sites around 
the nation. Regulating individuals triggers concerns about personal privacy, and regulators could 
face constitutional barriers to invading people’s homes. An emerging issue is that the information 
regulators need to detect and regulate individual players may be held by third parties, such as the 
platforms that broker individual transactions in the sharing economy. Regulators might lack 
jurisdiction to force the platforms to disclose information, if the platforms are not themselves 
involved in the activities (such as providing lodging or ride services) that trigger regulatory 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the platforms sometimes are subject to state privacy laws or business 
policies that force them to protect individuals’ privacy.  Finally, there is wide skepticism that 
coercive, top-down regulation would be effective. Social norms or other community-based 
mechanisms might offer better ways to promote good conduct at the level of individuals.  
There do not appear to be express statutory limits on the FDA’s ability to regulate 
individual DIYbio practitioners that become producers of medical products. The FDA’s statutes 
do not vary regulatory requirements based on the size of the manufacturer, although there is some 
easing of requirements based on the market size of the product. Thus, the FDA’s device statute 
eases regulatory burdens for custom devices, such as orthotic devices to help with foot pain and 
orthodontic appliances, which are customized for each patient.81 Custom devices are sold in 
quantities of five or fewer devices per year, although the companies that make them often are 
large-scale operations serving large numbers of customers. Drugs and biological products designed 
to treat rare diseases can obtain orphan drug designation, but the scale involved is still quite a large 
market serving up to 200,000 patients per year.82 The companies serving these niche markets may 
be large pharmaceutical companies in their own right, for which the orphan drug is only one of 
many product offerings.  
The FDA’s traditional non-regulation of individual producers reflects an exercise of 
enforcement discretion, rather than a jurisdictional limitation. A mother who makes chicken soup 
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for her family or friends with claims that it will cure their colds is, technically, a drug manufacturer. 
Mom intends for the soup to be used for “the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of” disease.83  So long as Mom’s soup distribution remains personal and non-commercial, the FDA 
generally looks the other way. If, however, mom scales up her operations and starts marketing 
soup commercially with curative claims, the agency could change course and send mom a warning 
letter. 
Zale maintains that twentieth-century regulations functioned well precisely because FDA 
and other regulators recognized a distinction between commercial and large-scale activities that 
warranted regulation, and personal or small-scale activities that deserved leniency.84 DIYbio is 
eroding these crucial distinctions. “Small-scale activities that once fit criteria for light or no 
regulation” can attain aggregate volumes that threaten to marginalize consumer-safety regulators, 
if they continue to focus only on traditional, large-scale players.85  
There have been many calls for safety regulators to step up their oversight of DIY 
genomics, yet the Coordinated Framework leaves them ill-equipped for the task. The contract 
laboratories and informatics service providers that enable individual production may themselves 
escape FDA oversight. The FDA technically has jurisdiction to regulate individual DIYbio 
producers that position their offerings as medical products. Yet the agency’s available regulatory 
tools, such as inspections, can be constitutionally cumbersome when the inspected facility is a 
person’s home. Traditional product developers, by obtaining FDA clearance or approval to market 
a product, effectively consent to inspection of their facilities; refusing to admit an FDA inspector 
is a prohibited act that can cause the product to become adulterated or misbranded.86 Yet if FDA 
inspectors show up at my home, they had better show me a warrant.87 This, of course, presumes 
the FDA finds out I am cooking up genetically modified things in my kitchen. What if individual 
DIYbio producers forget to comply with the FDA’s registration and listing regulations? 88 Those 
regulations require medical product manufacturers to make themselves known to the FDA so that 
the agency will know where to inspect. The agency staffing and budgets necessary to enforce FDA 
regulations against large numbers of individual DIYbio producers could make regulatory 
enforcement infeasible,  if DIYbio catches on and large numbers of Americans start to do it. 
 
Moral Problems in Regulating the Individual Producer/Consumer 
 
The practical regulatory challenges just described apply to individual DIYbio producers, 
whether they are making products for others under a consumer-to-consumer business model or 
developing products for their own enjoyment and use. This latter scenario, in which the individual 
doubles as producer and consumer, poses an additional complexity concerning the goals of 
consumer safety regulations. If an adult wishes to edit her genome to alter her body in ways that 
many people would regard as harmful, is it really the FDA’s role to stop her? By analogy, the FDA 
has no jurisdiction to stop people from covering their bodies with tattoos, although FDA is 
authorized to regulate the needles and ink to ensure they are sanitary and non-toxic. Congress 
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authorizes the FDA to regulate producers and distributors of medical products, but not to regulate 
consumers. DIYbio interjects a new self-service business model in which the individual is both 
producer and consumer. This creates a risk that the FDA’s role in regulating producers might blur 
into inappropriate regulation of consumers. How far can governments go in banning self-harming 
or personally risky conduct without infringing on citizens’ autonomy? 
 Joel Feinberg’s Harm to Self, explores this question, identifying ten principles that might 
justify governmental interventions to limit harms that people do to themselves, to others, or to the 
public at large.89 Of these ten principles, several are helpful to this discussion:   
• The Harm Principle refers to the concept that it is appropriate for the government to 
regulate an actor in order to avoid harms to persons other than the actor.90 Feinberg 
identifies this as the principle animating United States’ Food and Drug laws.91 The FDA 
regulates medical product manufacturers and distributors to keep them from offering 
products that might injure consumers.92 This principle also could encompass, for example, 
a regulation that prevents people of childbearing age from editing their own genomes in 
order to prevent possible harms to their future offspring. 
• The Offense Principle involves regulating an actor in order to keep that person from giving 
serious offense to others.93 This could, for example, encompass regulations that prevent 
people from editing their own genomes in ways that others might find scary or revolting, 
even if the editing poses no health risks to themselves or others. 
• Legal Paternalism involves applying governmental coercion to people to prevent the actors 
from harming themselves.94 This would encompass regulations aimed at stopping people 
from editing their genomes in ways that might be medically risky or harmful to their own 
health. 
• Legal Moralism approves the use of coercion to stop activities that do not necessarily harm 
or offend the actor or other people, but which seem inherently immoral or might cause 
broad harms to society or undermine morality in general.95 This is reminiscent of “the 
wisdom of repugnance” or “yuk factor,” that Leon Kass advanced as a reason to reject 
human cloning.96 It also encompasses a view that I refer to as “wildism,” the conviction 
that human gene editing should be avoided because people with pure, natural, wild-type 
human genomes are physically or morally superior to those who tamper with their native 
genetic purity.97    
 
Feinberg regards the Harm Principle and the Offense Principle as the only justifications for 
governmental coercion that are consistent with liberal principles.98 He notes that John Stuart Mill 
rejected Legal Paternalism as grounds for state coercion, viewing the goal of preventing self-harm 
 
89 JOEL FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME 3: HARM TO SELF, at xvi–xvii (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1989). 
90 Id.   
91 Id. at xvi. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at xvii. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at 17. 
97 Evans, supra note 46. 
98 FEINBERG, supra note 89, at 3. 
15 
 
as appropriate grounds to reason with people and attempt to persuade them to stop what they are 
doing, but not as grounds for compelling them to stop or punishing them if they persist.99  
Feinberg spills considerable ink reconciling the fact that many laws do seem paternalistic, 
even if the Harm and Offense Principles may, in theory, be the only legitimate grounds for 
governmental coercion. “[T]he view that the state has a right to protect people from their own folly 
seems to provide the rationale for many [laws] that nobody would wish to repeal.”100 He 
distinguishes “presumptively non-blameable” paternalism (exemplified by laws protecting 
genuinely vulnerable populations such as the elderly, the decisionally impaired, and children) from 
paternalism that is “presumptively blameable”.101 Under this latter category, he includes two 
concepts. The first is paternalism that is “benevolent” and well-intentioned in the sense of trying 
to protect people, but which overrides the autonomy of informed, competent adults who are neither 
vulnerable nor wish to be protected.102 The second is “non-benevolent” paternalism that dresses 
itself up as laws to protect people but, in reality, promotes unrelated goals such as industrial 
efficiency or liability risk management.  
Another important point is that some regulations are grounded in more than one principle, 
and the legislative intent is sometimes unclear or unstated. Some laws that seem paternalistic are, 
in fact, “mixed paternalistic laws” serving multiple objectives.103 A regulation might be motivated 
by “the need to protect the directly restricted party himself; but also to protect third parties from 
indirect harm, and even the general public from a kind of diffuse harm.”104 This soup of benevolent 
and non-benevolent paternalism is common in modern bioethical analysis. An example is policies 
that seek to limit individuals’ access to their own genetic and other health information. There is a 
benevolent concern that people may misunderstand their data, worry, or make bad medical 
decisions after they receive it..105 Simultaneously, there are non-benevolent concerns that sharing 
such data may be burdensome for researchers and waste scarce research and healthcare 
resources.106   
Feinberg recognizes that law has a useful role to play in ensuring that people’s choices 
reflect their true will. He describes “soft paternalism,” in which laws seek to ensure that people’s 
decisions are competent, voluntary, and well-informed, but respect their choices once these 
conditions are met.107 This approach is common in research regulations such as the Common 
Rule108 and the FDA research regulations,109 which allow people to expose themselves to research 
risks subject to protections to promote well-informed, autonomous decisions. Once those 
protections are in place, however, Feinberg’s anti-paternalistic view respects people’s right to 
make their own decisions.110  
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In reality, law frequently rejects this advice. An early example, dating back to the 1600’s, 
is Wright’s case, which is the English case in which an adult man consented to have another person 
cut off his hand with the aim of enhancing the man’s earnings as a beggar.111 The accomplice was 
later charged with mayhem and cited the man’s  consent as a defense, but without success. Such a 
consent was invalid, the court reasoned,  because it sought to deprive the King of the able-bodied 
work capacity of one of his subjects.112 In other words, the court resolved the case under the Harm 
Principle (the man had no right to harm the King), instead of on anti-paternalistic grounds.    
Wright’s case presents other nuances that are pertinent to regulation of DIYbio. There is a 
difference between “single-party” self-harm (doing harm to oneself) and “two-party” cases in 
which a person enlists the aid of others.113 A person’s consent to self-harm often exculpates 
accomplices to the self-harming scheme, but law treats certain consents, particularly when the 
consent is to an outrageous act, as void for public policy reasons.  In coming years, courts may 
have to set boundaries on which types of gene editing are within the limits of individual consent. 
A related question is whether the ostensible right to harm oneself encompasses a right to risk 
harming others by involving them in one’s scheme.  Those harms to others could include  
psychological harms such as feeling guilty or various legal risks if the scheme goes awry and has 
unintended consequences. The reason to restrict DIY genomics may not be Legal Paternalism 
(preventing harm to the individual) but rather the Harm Principle (keeping the individual from 
harming others).  
With that background, let us turn back to the question of how FDA should regulate DIYbio 
in which the person who produces a medical product will be its only consumer. This would exclude 
intra-family consumption, for example, if a parent performs at-home gene editing on  a child with 
a rare genetic disorder. That latter situation clearly falls under the Harm Principle, and FDA 
potentially could require the parent to obtain an investigational new drug (IND) application before 
administering the unapproved therapy to the child. While there is some room for debate, FDA 
officials have suggested in the past that the agency can require an IND in sponsor-investigator 
studies (where the research sponsor is the same as the investigator, in this example, the parent) 
even if the study has no commercial motive and there are no plans to submit study results to the 
FDA.114 If true, the agency has legal authority to oversee the parent’s experiment, but would face 
all the practical barriers the previous section described. In particular, how would the FDA know 
the research is happening? This seemingly is a matter for state children’s protective services 
agencies. State legislatures may soon need to update mandatory reporting statutes to require 
physicians, teachers, and daycare providers to report suspicions about inappropriate DIYbio 
research involving minors.   
When an adult of sound mind is both the producer and the only consumer of a DIYbio 
product, FDA involvement seems legally inappropriate. Feinberg is technically correct that the 
FDA’s medical product regulations implement the Harm Principle and are not grounded in Legal 
Paternalism.115 Placing the FDA into a new role of protecting people from themselves would mark 
a fundamental departure from Congress’s scheme of medical product regulation. This is not to 
deny, however, that FDA’s policies can seem paternalistic in fact, even when those policies are 
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nominally grounded in other principles. This is the agency that fought long court battles to prevent 
dying cancer patients from risking their health by taking Laetrile116 or by trying experimental 
therapies that had not yet completed all three phases of clinical trials.117 Moreover, the notion that 
the FDA regulates producers, not consumers, runs up against cases like Kessler v. Benten, in which 
a woman purchased mifepristone (a drug that blocks the female hormone progestin) overseas for 
her own personal use, only to have it confiscated when she returned to the United States.118 Despite 
that case, however, the agency often takes a non-paternalistic stance on imports for personal use, 
allowing consumers to import unapproved pork and beef insulin for their own consumption even 
though these products carry potentially serious risks, including the risk of transmitting mad-cow 
disease.119 Perhaps the Benten case is an outlier that rests on the Harm Principle rather than Legal 
Paternalism: the consumer stated she intended to use the mifepristone to induce an abortion, raising 
concerns about harm to the fetus. The drug has various other medical uses and perhaps could have 
been imported had she cited one of those.   
There is probably only a small number of DIYbio producer/consumers who desire to edit 
their own genomes and have the skills and determination to do it. It is inappropriate for the FDA 
to interfere with their activities. Regulation is, however, appropriate if such people offer their 
products to other consumers. This leaves the agency ample room to regulate individuals who 
manufacture biotechnology products for use by other people, while preserving a crucial space for 
citizen science and innovation within the narrow producer-as-consumer business model. DIYbio 
practitioners who publish their gene-editing instructions seemingly enjoy First Amendment 
protection unless this literature is prepared and/or distributed in a manner that causes it to become 
part of labeling for a gene-editing product that they or someone else is marketing.120 For reasons 
discussed earlier, software service providers and contract laboratories with which DIYbio 
practitioners do business may, in many instances, fall outside FDA jurisdiction.  Some may regard 
these limits on the agency’s jurisdiction as a matter of deep concern; others may view them as 
providing an important frontier for scientific and business-model innovation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Viewed through the lens of Professor Ikemoto’s “frontier” narrative, DIYbio offers a space 
of hope for rare-disease sufferers whose maladies affect too small a population to induce public 
funders and commercial biotechnology companies to invest in developing effective treatments. It 
is a space for pursuing enhancement, in a research ethical and funding environment that 
necessarily, but drearily, prioritizes the treatment of serious diseases over finding ways to make 
healthy people happier. DIYbio offers a frontier of science in service of what people actually want, 
instead of what ethicists, funding agencies, and commercial product developers think they ought 
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to have; supplied at prices they frequently cannot afford. Above all, it is a space for pursuing 
science as an expressive activity and provides an important space for business model innovation. 
There are regulatory gaps in the current Coordinated Framework, leaving aspects of DIYbio 
unregulated or ineffectively regulated. Before crafting governmental or non-governmental 
mechanisms to fill those gaps, there first needs to be a careful dialogue about the goals of regulation 
and appropriate principles to guide future regulatory efforts. 
